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Exploring the Economic Rationale for Protecting 
Geographical Indicators in Agriculture 
 
C Bramley & JF Kirsten1 
 
”The enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie 
increasingly in local things – knowledge, relationships, 
motivation – that distant rivals cannot match” 
 (Porter,  1998) 
Abstract 
The misappropriation of the names of geographical regions such as Parma, 
Roquefort and Champagne is protected in the European Union by a system of 
Geographical Indications, and is acknowledged by the World Trade 
Organization as an important intellectual property right. This article addresses 
whether there is a case for similar protection in South Africa. The article 
explores the economic rationale for implementing a system of Geographical 
Indications by addressing issues such as information asymmetry and the role 
of reputation; formation of niche markets; monopoly formation, value added 
and rural development. The economic rationale for protecting Geographical 
Indications derives mainly from the fact that place of origin may be used as a 
quality signal, or alternatively, that the resources of the region may be 
captured as quality attributes. In the first instance the meaning of the 
geographical name is emphasized in order to reduce information asymmetries. 
Where place of origin is used as an attribute, resources of the region are used 
to increase the value of the product. This includes specific resources such as 
production techniques, varieties and species, but also resources that are 
general to the region such as landscape, environment and culture. Economic 
arguments present a strong justification for the introduction of geographical 
indications in South Africa. At the same time it will afford greater protection 
to indigenous resources and geographical names which could, through the 





Recent news reports (Business Day, 15 March 2006) regarding the use of 
names such as Port and Sherry and the alternative names of Tawny and Ruby 
for South African liquor products have once again put the issue of 
                                                 
1 The authors are both from the Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural 
Development, University of Pretoria 
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Geographical Indications (GIs) in the spotlight. At issue, is the increasing 
trend by food companies and producers to use regional names to distinguish 
agricultural products. This follows trends in the food sector over the past 
decade which indicate that consumers are increasingly placing value on 
products they can associate with a certain place and/or special means of 
production (Ilbery & Kneafsey, 1998). This renewed interest in “authentic”, 
“traditional”, “wholesome” and “traceable” food results from a range of 
factors such as increased awareness of food safety, the socio-cultural status of 
consuming certain foods and renewed interest in and, nostalgia of, culinary 
heritage (Ilberry & Kneafsey, 2000).  
 
Given the global, competitive environment characterized by declining 
agricultural commodity prices, this trend towards traditional and/or quality 
products provides producers of origin labelled products with the opportunity 
to move away from commodity markets into more lucrative niche markets 
through differentiation. It is a well-established fact that rural communities 
throughout the world have over centuries developed typical products, based 
on the interaction between local know-how (including selection, production 
and processing) and particular environmental conditions such as the soil and 
climate. Take for example the images of windmills and sheep, farm 
homesteads, endless vistas, and tranquillity, which are encapsulated in the 
name “Karoo”. These attributes of the Karoo region provide a certain 
commercial value or premium to products ‘originating’ from the Karoo, as the 
name “Karoo” has become synonymous with quality, tradition and 
wholesomeness. 
 
The commercial value of geographical names is confirmed by the increasing 
number of trade marks being registered which incorporate regional names, in 
an attempt by firms to identify and link their products to names and regions of 
reputation. With this comes the threat of misappropriation, as producers not 
even remotely linked to the geography or the values and images of the region, 
exploit regional names for profit. It is this misappropriation of the names of 
geographical regions (and to some extent other indigenous resources) that led 
European nations to protect names such as Parmesan, Roquefort, Champagne, 
Port and Sherry through a system of Geographical Indications. Geographical 
Indication systems ensure that only producers within a specific geographical 
region benefit from the commercial exploitation of their heritage. In addition 
to preventing misappropriation of local resources, the protection of 
Geographical Indications provide a valuable marketing tool through which to 
improve market access and promote niche products. This in turn has 
important implications for rural development, as it provides an opportunity to 





Sadly however, this link between product and region, embedded in local 
culture, has to a large extent been left unexploited and vulnerable to 
misappropriation in South Africa. The question which arises is, therefore, 
whether there is not an argument to be made for a similar system of protecting 
geographical names and indigenous resources in South Africa. 
 
This is the context of this paper, as it explores the economic rationale for the 
implementation of a system of geographical indications, in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the importance of protecting geographical 
indications.  Those calling for increased protection of geographical indications 
are motivated by various socio-economic objectives such as increased rural 
incomes and consumer protection. This paper aims to illustrate how these 
objectives can be achieved through the use of geographical indications by 
addressing the following points consecutively: information asymmetry and 
the role of reputation, formation of niche markets, monopoly formation and 
value added. The discussion draws from different economic theories in an 
attempt to explain the economic fundamentals underlying the protection of 
geographical indications. The issue is necessarily addressed from an economic 
perspective and does not include advantages at national level such as the 
preservation of biodiversity. The paper concludes with an analysis of how the 
economic rationale behind geographical indications contribute towards rural 
development objectives.  
 
2. Defining Geographical Indications 
 
Unlike other categories of intellectual property rights such as patents and 
trademarks, there is no general definition accepted worldwide for 
geographical indications (Escudero, 2001):   
 
“W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  d e s i g n  l a w ,  t h e r e  i s  p r o b a b l y  n o  c a t e g o r y  o f  
intellectual property law where there exists such a variety of concepts of 
protection as in the field of geographical indications. This is maybe best 
demonstrated by the term ‘geographical indication’ itself, which is 
relatively new and appeared only recently in international 
negotiations.” 
 
This section will attempt to clarify the terminology used by looking at the 
different types of geographical indications recognized by legal doctrine and 
the various characteristics of each.   Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Bramley & Kirsten 
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2.1 Indications of source 
 
The term “indication of source” is used in both the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 (section 1.2 and section 10) and the 
Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False and Deceptive Indications of 
Source on Goods of 1891 (section 1). Based on the language used in these 
treaties an indication of source can be defined as (Baeumer, 1999): 
 
“An indication referring to a country or to a place situated therein as 
being the country or place of origin of a product.” 
 
There are three key components to this concept (Rangnekar, 2003a): 
 
•  There is a clear link between the indication and geographical origin;  
 
•  Unlike other indications of geographical origin, there is no requirement for 
distinguishing qualities or attributes of the good;  
 
•  The protected indication can be constituted by words or phrases that 
directly indicate geographical origin or phrases, symbols or iconic emblems 
associated with the area of geographical origin.  
 
An indication of source, for example “Made in South Africa”, is distinguished 
from a geographical indication in that its definition does not imply any special 
quality, reputation or characteristic that is attributable to its geographical 
origin. As such, an indication of source is dependant only on the product’s 
geographical origin and not necessarily its inherent qualities.  
  
2.2 Geographical indications 
 
Part two (section three) of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement deals with the 
protection of “geographical indications”. The concept is defined as (section 
22.1): 
 
“Indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
Member [of the WTO], or region or locality in that territory, where a 
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographic origin.”  
 
Three conditions must be met (Rangnekar, 2003a): 




•  The indication must necessarily identify a good and can be non-
geographical names, iconic symbols, words or phrases; 
 
•  The good must necessarily possess “given quality”, “reputation” or “other 
characteristics” that are “essentially attributed” to the designated 
geographical area of origin;  
 
•  The designated geographical area must be identified by the indication.  
 
An example of a geographical indication would be Karoo Lamb. 
 
2.3 Appellations of origin 
 
The term appellation of origin is mentioned in the Paris Convention (section 
1.2) and defined in the Lisbon Agreement as follows (section 2.1): 
 
“Appellation of origin means the geographical name of a country, 
region or locality which serves to designate a product originating 
therein, the quality and characteristics of which are due exclusively or 
essentially to the geographical environment, including natural and 
human factors.”  
 
The key components to this concept are (Rangnekar, 2003a): 
 
•  Appellations must be direct geographical names;  
 
•  The appellation must serve as a designation of geographical origin of the 
product; 
 
•  Quality and characteristics exhibited by the product must be essentially 
attributable to the designated area of geographical origin.  
 
Appellations of origin can thus be regarded as a special type of indication of 
source in that it not only conveys the geographical source of a product but 
makes a direct link between a product’s quality and its geographical origin. 
An example of an appellation of origin would be Roquefort Cheese, produced 
in Roquefort, France. 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that ‘indication of source’ is the broadest 
term. It includes both ‘geographical indications’ and ‘appellations of origin’. In 
turn, geographical indications are more broadly defined than appellations of Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Bramley & Kirsten 
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origin. All appellations of origin are thus geographical indications but some 
geographical indications are not appellations of origin 
 
For purposes of this paper, the term “geographical indication” will be used in 
the broad sense. However, it should be noted that different terminology is 
used in the different international legal instruments and that the rights and 
obligations flowing from these instruments exist only in relation to the 
category of geographical indication to which the instrument in question refers. 
In practice, it would, therefore, sometimes be necessary to make a distinction 
in the context of the regulation or agreement under consideration (WIPO, 
2002).  
 
3. Economic rationale for protecting geographical indications  
 
3.1 The economics of information and reputation 
 
Marks indicating the geographical origin of goods  are the earliest type of 
trademark used by traders as a means to exploit local reputation through the 
use of distinctive signs to evoke a particular geographical origin (Rangnekar, 
2003b). Although distinct intellectual property rights, this association suggests 
similarity in the economic rationale for protecting geographical indications 
and trademarks. The economics underlying the protection of these distinctive 
signs is founded on the economic theories of information and reputation. 
These theories demonstrate the importance of (1) preventing the market 
distortions that arise when there is asymmetry of information between 
producers and consumers and (2) averting the consequences of such 
asymmetry of information on the level of output quality (OECD, 2000).  
 
Nelson (1970) shows that consumers do not have perfect access to information 
regarding the prices of goods, and even less so as to the quality of the goods. 
He classified goods on the basis of how information is accessed by and/or 
conveyed to consumers. This is summarised in table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Classification of goods based on access to information 
Search  goods  Consumers can ascertain quality prior to purchase 
through inspection and/or research. 
Experience  goods  Consumers can ascertain quality after purchase 
through use and experience. 
Credence  goods  Neither prior inspection nor subsequent use is 
sufficient to ascertain quality. Purchase decisions will 
be based mainly on the information provided by the 
producer. Independent certification becomes 





The problem of asymmetrical information thus stems from the fact that the 
producer knows the product attributes while consumers do not know them 
and can only determine them through search or experience (OECD, 2000). This 
information gap gives lead to typical market information problems in the form 
of adverse selection and moral hazard, originally described by Akerlof (1970) 
in his work on the market for second hand cars. The relevance of these 
problems in the case of agricultural products is that food products, in terms of 
the categorisation in Table 1, display characteristics of all three types of goods 
(Rangnekar, 2003b). As food markets are characterized by varying qualities, 
only the producer is aware of the product’s quality in advance, while the 
consumer runs the risk of buying an inferior product due to adverse selection.  
 
It is clear that information asymmetry impacts negatively on the market: the 
quality of total supply drops, higher-quality products are driven out of the 
market and some consumers will no longer be able to satisfy their preferences 
(OECD, 2000). Producers maintaining the quality of their products are exposed 
to unfair competition from producers who sell lower quality products at the 
same price. In order to protect themselves against such behaviour consumers 
adopt various strategies. These include the making of repeat purchases, 
developing a strong sense of brand loyalty and a willingness to pay a 
premium for reputation. In response, producers adopt strategies for creating 
reputation in their products.  
 
The concept of reputation, widely used in analysis of markets characterized by 
imperfect information (Stiglitz, 1989; Tirole, 1988), serves to an extent to bridge 
the market failure associated with asymmetry of information. In his model on 
reputation, Shapiro (1982 and 1983) analyses the firm’s choices regarding the 
quality level of its production with a view to maximizing profits in a situation 
where it is assumed that markets are perfectly competitive but information is 
imperfect (OECD, 2000). He stresses the importance of the dynamics emerging 
among the following three elements: firm reputation, consumer learning and 
the seller’s choice of product quality (OECD, 2000). If product quality cannot 
be observed in advance, consumers tend to use the quality of products offered 
by the same producer in the past as an indicator of future levels of quality. 
According to Shapiro (1983) reputation thus embodies expected quality in that 
individuals extrapolate past behaviour to make inferences about likely future 
behaviour. This value judgment develops over time creating an intangible 
asset whose value is given by capitalisation of future price premiums (Belletti, 
1999). 
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In instances where purchase decisions are based on product reputation, 
producers who decide to produce for the high quality market are forced to 
invest in reputation. Often this period of investment requires the producer to 
sell his product below production costs until reputation has been established 
(OECD, 2000). The need to make initial investments means that in an 
equilibrium scenario, high-quality goods must be sold at premium prices 
(OECD, 2000). This premium represents the returns on the initial investment 
to establish the reputation (Shapiro, 1983). Given this, products which enjoy 
reputation earn a premium that is sustained even at equilibrium (Rangnekar, 
2003b). Rangnekar (2003b) explains that the premium earned is proportional to 
the lags associated in consumers learning the true quality of a product. It 
follows from this that a producer will only be motivated to improve its 
product quality if consumers undergo a learning process regarding the quality 
of its products. The premium can thus be justified based on the role reputation 
plays in reducing information asymmetries and its role in dissuading short 
term compromises in quality thereby lowering the actual price paid by 
reducing search costs for the consumer. In the context of information 
asymmetry, reputation thus becomes both an inducer and indicator of quality.  
 
However, the successful use of reputation to restore efficiency to the market 
through averting the consequences of information asymmetries, requires that 
reputation be protected through a process which can be viewed as the 
“institutionalisation of reputation”. Distinctive signs such as geographical 
indications are one way of achieving this, by making use of a process which 
requires formalisation of the relationship between the product and the region 
and/or tradition. This formalisation derives from the use of legal instruments 
that prevent the misappropriation of benefits.  
 
These quality signals embody reputation in that they signal a certain level of 
quality. The quality signal reduces the information and search cost for buyers 
if it reveals quality differences. It is through this function of signalling certain 
quality standards (and thus reputation) that consumers are induced to return 
and purchase new products that a trademark (and thus a geographical 
indication) becomes an asset of the firm, embodying its accumulated goodwill 
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1988). The collective nature of geographical 
indications as a quality signal means that use of the sign is not limited to a 
single producer but to all producers within the designation which adhere to 
the code of practice. Product reputation is thus the result of the actions of 
different agents active in the same area of production and is projected through 
tradition over a period of time (Marty, 1998).  




In conclusion, it could thus be said that geographical indications are the result 
of a process whereby collective reputation is institutionalised in order to solve 
certain problems that arise from information asymmetry and free riding on 
reputation. As such, the abovementioned theories of information and 
reputation highlight two important features of geographical indications 
protection i.e. that it functions as both a consumer protection measure 
(through addressing information asymmetries and quality) and a producer 
protection measure (through its role in protecting reputation as an asset).  
 
3.2  Improved market access 
 
Apart from its role in overcoming the detrimental effects of information 
asymmetries and free riding on reputation, geographical indications also 
reflect inherent values associated with a region and thus regional quality. As 
such, territory goes beyond its purely informative role and acquires the 
characteristics of an attribute (Pacciani et al., 2001). The resources of the region 
(landscape, cultural and historical resources and local savoir faire1) become 
encapsulated in the origin labelled product, thereby synthesizing the territorial 
attributes in the product name. It is this characteristic of territory as an 
attribute that translates into improved market access for products bearing a 
geographical indication, through increased competitiveness in the market and 
the development of a sustainable competitive advantage. This section explores 
the economics behind improved market access for products bearing a 
geographical indication with reference to the creation of niche markets, 
monopoly formation and value added.  
 
3.2.1 Formation of niche markets 
 
Decreasing prices, changing consumer preferences and increased competition 
on commodity markets have created a need for an alternative approach to the 
production and marketing of agricultural products. As a result, producers are 
moving away from commodity production and entering more lucrative niche 
markets. These producers firstly face the challenge of finding a market with 
consumer appeal and economic value and secondly of protecting the market 
against competitors that would eventually erode any premiums. The second 
challenge derives from the fact that once competitive advantage has been 
created, other producers enter the market to capture the higher profits. As 
more producers enter the market, the product begins to move from niche to 
commodity status, thereby eroding any premiums earned.   
 
The advantage associated with niche production is evident if one compares the 
position of a cereal producer and maize farmer (Hayes et al., 2003). The first Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Bramley & Kirsten 
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has absolute control over supply and must decide on the price. Typically one 
that covers costs and gives reasonable return to capital. The latter cannot 
influence the price as no single commodity producer can alter the market 
price. He must inevitably accept the market price even though it doesn’t cover 
costs. The difference is that the cereal manufacturer has differentiated itself 
and consumers view its product as unique, whereas the farmer sells an 
undifferentiated product. From a consumer perspective, if faced with a 
commodity product, decisions will be based on price. The benefit of 
differentiation and niche production is clear: differentiation allows a producer 
to move away from being a price taker towards being a price maker and thus 
brings freedom from the price fluctuations associated with commodity 
markets (Hayes et al., 2003).  
 
Why then do farmers refrain from differentiating? According to Hayes et al. 
(2003) farmers are often faced with a lack of price incentives due to 
commingling. Even where wholesale buyers provide price incentives to 
farmers to produce high quality products, competition from other farmers 
eliminates the profitability thereof. Also, the scale of any individual farmer’s 
output is too small to justify the cost of creating and maintaining a brand that 
is recognizable by consumers and that cannot easily be imitated.  
 
Based on these problems, Hayes et al. (2003) conclude that any instrument 
designed to differentiate agricultural produce must meet a number of criteria. 
Firstly, it should allow price signals to be transmitted from consumer to 
producer. Secondly, it should achieve a scale of production sufficiently large to 
justify the cost of creating and maintaining the differentiated image among 
consumers. Thirdly, it should prevent imitation of the differentiated product. 
Lastly, if profits associated with the differentiated product are to be captured 
by farmers rather than other actors in the supply chain, the farmers must own 
the rights to the differentiated product.  
 
Through the creation of a set of institutions geographical indications are 
instrumental in affording producers pursuing a niche based strategy an 
opportunity for place-based product differentiation. In discussing place-based 
marketing strategies, Thode and Maskulka (1998) mention that although 
product positioning based on product attributes and image is still viewed as a 
necessary and viable strategy, marketers increasingly lament that there are 
simply too many parity products (Giges, 1988). Porter (1980) argues that the 
“parity trap” can be avoided through strategic marketing in order to create a 
sustainable competitive advantage. His method of matching a company’s 
strengths with market opportunities to create a sustainable advantage is 




competition, this approach has been challenged on the grounds that a 
sustainable competitive advantage is becoming more difficult to achieve and, 
more importantly, to maintain (D’Aveni, 1994). Thode and Maskulka (1998) 
acknowledge that the level of competition world-wide has intensified, but 
proposes that sustainable competitive advantage based strategies are still 
viable as long as they are unique, truly differentiable and directly tied to the 
tangible quality of the product.  
 
In this regard, place of origin provides a unique positioning opportunity. The 
premise on which place-based niche marketing rests is the fact that the 
economic value of certain products can be attributed to the unique 
environment from where they originate. Place could thus be used as a basis for 
differentiation if there is a perceptible, not necessarily quantifiable, link 
between the product’s place of origin and the presumed quality of the product 
(Thode & Maskulka 1998). The potential economic value of this approach is 
reflected in the fact that the market value of quality goods identified with a 
specific territorial indication of origin is estimated to be around 7.5% of the 
European market (Euro 45 Billion) with an estimated increase of Euro 1-2 
billion per year (Trognon et al., 1999). Trognon et al. (1999) emphasises that this 
should not be perceived as merely a fashion phenomenon but as a growing 
trend.  
 
The potential of geographical indications as a quality label facilitating place-
based differentiation and thereby creating niche markets, is further evident if 
measured by the abovementioned conditions for differentiation as set out by 
Hayes et al. (2003). The central tenet on which geographical indications operate 
is that of supply control both, by demarcating the geographical area within 
which production may take place, as well as limiting the yields within the 
demarcated area. By limiting supply, producers entitled to use the 
geographical indication obtain reasonable premiums. A low level of 
production coupled with high prices will provide incentives to other 
producers to increase production, but increased production will lead to lower 
prices and profits. This poses the biggest challenge facing niche producers, 
that is, ensuring that entry into the market is limited, thereby preventing the 
erosion of any premiums. This challenge derives from the fact that once 
competitive advantage has been created other producers enter the market to 
capture the higher profits. As more producers enter the market the product 
begins to move from a niche to a commodity product, thereby eroding any 
premiums earned. The success of any niche market will, therefore, in the long 
run depend on its ability to limit production. In the case of geographical 
indications, appropriate regulations serve to limit entry and yields. The 
institutional framework within which geographical indications operate thus Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Bramley & Kirsten 
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provides a legal framework within which producers can obtain property rights 
on the differentiated product thereby preventing other producers from 
entering the market and allowing the producers entitled to use the 
geographical indication to appropriate the benefits. This framework further 
facilitates collective production and marketing, providing the necessary scale 
of production required to justify the cost of creating and maintaining the 
differentiated product image.  This is particularly important in the case of 
artisinal products (with the majority of geographical indications being 
artisinal) which are labour intensive rather than capital intensive and, 
therefore, cannot benefit from economies of scale. This is confirmed by 
research (Barjolle & Chappuis, 2000) which indicates that these producers 
increase their chances of success by adopting a common market strategy 
which allows them to attain a scale of production large enough to justify the 
investments in product image.  
 
The economic value of geographical indications is thus to a large extent based 
on the economics of differentiation and niche marketing. It is a socially 
constructed differentiation which is exogenously validated and allows small 
producers to create a competitive advantage similar to that of a trademark.  
 
However, Alavoine-Mornas (1997) warns that the originality a typical local 
area brings to a product can only lead to a differentiation, if clients recognize 
its value. This highlights the fact that in some instances niche marketing 
through origin labelling may require an extensive awareness campaign in 
order to capture the benefits associated with differentiation. Also, it should be 
noted that various factors could weaken the territorial associations consumers 
have with a product. These factors include aspects such as packaging, 
processing, distribution and marketing. In certain instances technical aspects 
of production and/or processing can override features of the product that are 
intrinsically linked to its area of origin (Rangnekar, 2003a). 
 
 
3.2.2 Monopoly formation 
 
In terms of the neoclassical economic theory, geographical indications are 
considered to be collective monopolies (Moran, 1993). Seemingly a contradictio 
in terminis2, the existence of monopolies consisting of a group of firms was 
argued by Olsen (1962): “The concept of industry in pure competition, which 
is everywhere acknowledged, is based on assumptions that are perfectly 
parallel to those required for the concept of industry in monopolistic 
competition, which is often denied”.  




The collective nature of geographical indications is well explained with 
reference to Buchanan’s (1965) club theory and the case of Protected 
Designations of Origin (PDOs) and Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs) 
created under EU Regulation 2081/92. Cornes and Sandler (1996), as cited by 
Thiedig and Sylvander (2000), define a club as “a voluntary group of 
individuals who derive mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the 
following: production costs, membership characteristics or a good 
characterized by excludable benefits”.  
 
Legally protected geographical indications like the PDOs/PGIs under EU 
Regulation 2081/92 are considered to be club goods coupled with government 
support to provide it, whilst geographical indications protected only by 
competition law are club goods with no or little governmental support for a 
more or less latent group (Thiedig & Sylvander, 2000). In comparing PDO/PGI 
clubs to the characteristics of a club as identified by Cornes & Sandler (1996), 
Torres (2000) makes the following observations: 
 
¾  Voluntarism: The decision to provide a PDO/PGI is voluntary. However, 
once the group is established, all the producers using the protected name 
within the delimitation are compulsory members, even if they have not 
applied for the protection. All involuntary members have to contribute to 
the control costs. However, all members also share in the benefits. 
Members are free to leave the club by ceasing to use the denomination.  
 
¾  Sharing: The PDO/PGI is shared by members of the group of producers in 
the demarcated area. It is not evident whether extension leads to signs of 
congestion. It is assumed that at the beginning new members increase the 
utility for everyone due to camaraderie, but after a critical number of 
members congestion will occur. PDO clubs are less at risk given that 
membership and volume of production o f  t h e  c l u b  g o o d  is limited by 
geographical delimitation and product specification. PGI clubs are more 
likely to show signs of congestion given weaker constraints. Illegitimate 
use of the designation can decrease the benefits significantly. Also, 
crowding appears to be a danger for the origin labelled sector in general, 
for as the list of recognized indications grows profits for existing 
indications may decrease.  According to Thiedig and Sylvander (2000) this 
raises the issue of “hostclubs” which they define as “clubs of clubs” such as 
the French Institut National Des Appellations D’Origine (INAO) as well as the 
European Register created under EU Regulation 2081/92. 
 
¾  Exclusivity: The group itself defines exclusivity by delimiting the 
production area as well as by agreeing on product specifications in the code Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Bramley & Kirsten 
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of practice. Consequently, only producers within the demarcated region 
complying with the code of practice, may join the club.  
 
¾  Exclusion mechanism: The PDO/PGI legislation provides for exclusion by 
making provision for private or public inspection bodies which ensure that 
members comply with the rules while authorities oversee all uses of the 
designation. Under EU Regulation 2081/92 the exclusion mechanism is 
territorially bound and therefore limited by the borders of the European 
Union. This limits its effectiveness and explains the importance for the 
European Union of extending the protection provided under TRIPS.   
 
This discussion on club theory confirms the collective nature of geographical 
indications as reflected in the widely articulated view that geographical 
indications are collective processes of value creation (Barjolle & Sylvander, 
2000). This means that producers belonging to the collective are faced with a 
unique collective cum3 competitive situation in that not only do they 
collectively produce a common good, they also compete within the collective 
at individual level. As a result, further differentiation often takes place within 
the designation through the use of private brands.  
 
These collectives further exhibit the characteristics of a monopoly in that they 
segment the production market and erect entry barriers on producers both 
within and outside the relevant geographical area. The monopoly formation 
observed in geographical indication supply chains takes place by way of 
institutional barriers which limit entry at two levels: firstly, only producers 
within the demarcated area qualify for participation. This is followed by 
another barrier in that, within this region, only producers who comply with 
the code of practice fall within the collective. These institutional barriers which 
are created by limiting the use of the designation and defining the product and 
production process, facilitate the formation of a monopoly which encompasses 
all producers within the designation who comply with the code of practice. As 
a result, protection of geographical indications imposes, with reference to 
producers outside the designation, a monopolistic market structure, given the 
causal link between a product and its origin which results in a proprietary 
right, for those entitled to use it. The monopoly thus created is not unlike that 
which is legitimised under trade mark law by allowing a “monopolistic right” 
to a trade mark. However, for producers located within the designation, 
geographical indications retain local, public good characteristics of non-rivalry 
and non-exclusion. By limiting entry and functioning as a barrier to trade 
these collective monopolies thus eliminate competition from similar products 
produced elsewhere, thereby improving market access for those producers 





3.3 Value added 
 
It is clear from the discussion on monopoly formation in origin labelled supply 
chains that the institutional barriers limiting the use of a designation act as a 
protective belt whereby geographical indication supply chains are collectively 
monopolized. Work done by Thiedig and Sylvander (2000) indicates origin 
labelled monopolies’ potential of earning a premium. That there is indeed a 
premium to be captured in locality is reflected by the fact that French origin 
labelled cheeses earn an average of 2 euros per kilo more than French non-
origin labelled cheeses. French Poulet de Bresse has a market price 4 times 
higher than regular French chicken. Producers of milk used for Comté cheese 
are paid 10% over regular milk prices. Similarly, producers of Italian Tuscano 
olive oil have managed to earn a premium of 20% since registration as a 
geographical indication in 1998 (EU Background Note, 2004).   
 
The size of the premium is dependent on a number of factors such as market 
size, degree of competition with substitutes, consumer perceptions about the 
linkage of an indication with product attributes and demand elasticity (Correa, 
2002). However, in all instances the premium seems to favour authentic and 
distinctive products linked to a specific area (Correa, 2002). The premium 
captured by products displaying a geographical indication suggests that some 
form of value is embedded in the use of this intellectual property right. This 
value is a mixture of economic, cultural and social values which derive from 
locality. Those actors using a geographical indication are thus pursuing a 
valorisation strategy whereby intellectual property is harnessed in an attempt 
to appropriate these values which allow for the extraction of rent.  
 
3.4 Rural development potential 
 
Apart from, and partly a consequence of the factors identified above, the most 
fundamental rationale for protecting geographical indications in the European 
Union is found in the rural development potential of origin labelled products. 
Both widespread literature and policies adopted by the European Union stress 
the importance of supporting origin labelled products to attain this objective 
(Pacciani et al, 2001). Origin labelled products, per definition, reflects a strict 
link between product and origin given that the product derives its unique 
characteristics from the climatic, human and technical environment of the 
region. As such, origin labelled products is one of the most evident 
manifestations of locality and is often considered useful instruments through 
which to preserve local culture and traditions and to foster rural development 
especially in disadvantaged areas (Pacciani et al, 2001).  Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Bramley & Kirsten 
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In a rural development context geographical indications provide a tool by 
which rural producers can enter niche markets and earn the concomitant 
premiums, thereby contributing to improving their living conditions. 
Furthermore, the link between an origin labelled product and its territory 
derives not only from paedoclimatic specificities and its strong link with 
localised specific production assets; it also derives from local culture as it 
characterizes the “historical memory” of the local population and represents a 
catalyst of identity (Bérard and Marchenay, 1995). As such, geographical 
indications engage local resources, both natural and human, in a collective 
process involving all local actors, thereby activating all the components of the 
rural economy.  
 
In analyzing the rural development potential of geographical indications it is 
necessary to distinguish two potential impacts. The first relates to the 
remuneration of specific assets directly involved in the production process. In 
this regard, the link between an origin labelled product and its area of origin 
allows for the creation of rents based on the “qualities” of the product, 
allowing for the remuneration of the specific assets used in the production 
process. The second impact on rural development relates to an inclusive 
territorial benefit to all actors within the region.  The latter refers to the 
indirect benefits which may flow from establishing a geographical indication 
for certain regional products as reflected in for example, employment levels 
and income support. Furthermore, geographical indications may contribute to 
the local economy by maintaining economic and social activities in 
underprivileged areas, thereby stabilizing the activities it promotes.  
 
According to Pacciani et al. (2001) these effects rely on the extent to which local 
actors succeed in appropriating the rent with respect to actors located outside 
the territory. Given that the assets from which origin labelled products derive 
are employable by a plurality of actors without the possibility of individual 
appropriation, the potential of appropriating this rent is closely tied to the 
ability of local actors to create institutional processes that can regulate the use 
of these free goods (Pacciani et al., 2001). The possibility of enhancing rural 
development through use of geographical indications is further dependent on 
exogenous factors such as the nature of the product as influenced by the level 
of elaboration, the characteristics of the production process, the marketing 
channels allowed by the nature of the product, the impact on the landscape 
and environment, the role of the product in the local culture as well as the 
structure of the supply chain (Pacciani et al., 2001). In addition, the possibility 
of activating endogenous, integrated and sustainable rural development 




strong the association between the product and the local community is. In this 
regard, not all products are alike, depending on their symbolic content and 
identity within the local community and their presence and importance in the 
local economy (Pacciani et al., 2001). It should furthermore, be added that it is 
not the institutionalisation of the resource origin itself that sets the conditions 
for development (Sylvander, 2004). Instead, it is argued that it depends on 
how this process is developed, and on the effectiveness of the valorisation 
strategies built upon it (Sylvander, 2004).  
 
The evaluation of the impact of origin labelled products on rural development 
should be based on the multifunctional nature of origin labelled products 
(Sylvander, 2004), accounting also for indirect development goals such as the 
preservation of biodiversity and traditional knowledge. As such, assessment 
of the impact should not be limited to the standard criteria (higher prices, 
increased sales and employment and income levels). The spread of the 
economic effects within the rural area, the level of participation of local actors, 
the sustainability and reproduction of the social system and the environmental 
impact are all factors which should be considered (Sylvander, 2004) in 
evaluating the impact of origin labelled products on rural development.  
 
However, a prerequisite for geographical indications to act as a rural 
development tool is an inclusive and representative industry organisation, 
that ensures participation of local actors and an equitable flow of economic 
benefits. Given the potentially exclusive nature of geographical indications, 
the danger exists that large farmers and agribusiness firms could capture the 
benefits that result from the geographical indication, without any benefits 
flowing to smaller, rural actors who are often the original custodians of the 
local resource. This is of particular importance in the South African context 




4. Geographical Indications versus Trade Marks 
 
Section 3 provides convincing arguments in favour of protecting geographical 
indications. The question which arises is whether the economic rationale 
behind geographical indication protection is not already captured under 
existing trade mark laws. It has proved to be a divisive question which has 
resulted in an international debate on the protection of geographical 
indications. Various countries such as the United States, argue that 
geographical indications are sufficiently protected under existing trade mark Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Bramley & Kirsten 
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laws. Other countries such as the European Union, propose a sui generis4 
system for protecting geographical indications. 
 
As a founding member of the WTO, South Africa must comply with the 
minimum requirements for the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, as provided for in TRIPS. TRIPS does not provide a specific 
system of protection and merely requires that Members provide the “legal 
means” to prevent the misleading or unfair use of a geographical indication. 
South Africa complies with the TRIPS provisions through a combination of 
consumer protection and unfair competition laws, its trade marks registration 
system and an administrative scheme for the protection of its geographical 
indications for wine (Laing, 2005). South Africa thus essentially follows the 
United States’ example of protecting geographical indications under trade 
mark laws. 
 
By providing for the protection and registration of geographical indications 
under trade mark law, geographical indications are treated as a species of 
trade marks. Although all WTO Members have agreed that geographical 
indications should be recognized as a form of intellectual property, it should 
be understood that it differs fundamentally from trade marks. Both trade 
marks and geographical indications serve as distinctive signs whose purpose 
is to distinguish products and who are capable of acknowledging the link 
between a product and its origin. At a fundamental level however, there is a 
difference in terms of what the distinctive sign is signifying (Rangnekar, 
2003a). Trade marks are distinctive signs identifying the relationship between 
the proprietor of the mark and his goods or services, and thus not limited by 
any territorial link. In contrast, geography is at the heart of geographical 
indications (Moran, 1993) – they being distinctive signs identifying goods as 
originating from a particular geographical area. Geographical indications thus 
show a link between the goods and their place of origin. As the definition 
indicates, this form of intellectual property claims that the unique qualities of 
certain products derive from a combination of features of the natural 
environment and traditional practices of the people living there. Fundamental 
to this claim is that these characteristics cannot be produced elsewhere. This 
forms the basis of one of the most fundamental differences between trade 
marks and geographical indications, in that the latter cannot be delocalized 
and therefore never sold as in the case of trade marks. This is in line with the 
good-place link on which geographical indication protection is based and 
which prohibits the transfer of the indication to producers outside the 
demarcated area. In contrast the right to assign or license is available to trade 
mark holders. This is inconsistent with the philosophical foundation of 





A further difference between trade marks and geographical indications is the 
private versus public nature of the rights which flow from the marks. Despite 
intellectual property being classified as private rights, geographical indications 
exhibit public good characteristics in that they are linked to a territory and 
cannot be privately owned by a single proprietor. In the case of geographical 
indications it is not a single person but all producers belonging to the region 
and adhering to product specifications that may lay title to ownership of the 
designation. The notion that a common good belonging to a specific territory 
could be privately owned, as is the case with trade marks or collective marks, 
is not accepted. In contrast, trade marks are true private property rights and 
are by their nature distinctive signs which are used by persons to distinguish 
their goods or services from those of others in the course of trade. As 
mentioned, geographical indications do not identify a particular producer. A 
trade mark is thus more linked to the notion of individual production and 
promotion whereas geographical indications are based on collective 
ownership. This collective element runs counter to the traditional concept of 
intellectual property rights which, as stated in TRIPS (section 4), are private 
rights. In addition to this legal difficulty, implementation difficulties exist. 
Collective management is successful only to the extent that common rules are 
issued and applied. The collective trade mark may fulfil this function by 
organizing the control of the application of common rules, but the legal 
character of the mark, even when it is collective, makes it more vulnerable 
than the geographical indication.  
 
Related to the private nature of trade mark protection, the cost of protection is 
often prohibitively high for resource poor producers. Protection under trade 
mark systems requires costly registrations. In order to effect full protection 
multiple registrations may be necessary to protect a single geographical 
indication in the original language, in translated form a s  w ell  a s  i n des i g n 
form. Also, to protect geographical indications internationally under trade 
mark law, the indication needs to be registered as a trade mark in every 
country where protection is sought. Given the trend towards greater 
globalization of markets this could place a considerable burden on a producer 
which could be considerably alleviated by a transnational system of protection 
such as the proposed multilateral register. If protection against unauthorized 
use of a trade mark is sought, it is up to the trade mark owner to institute legal 
action and carry the concomitant costs. Ideally, a sui generis system would 
provide for the State to institute action on behalf of those producers entitled to 
use the designation. This is an important issue for small producers who may 
not have the resources to ensure effective legal protection under a trade mark 
system.  Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Bramley & Kirsten 
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Another factor which relates to cost, is the duration of protection under a trade 
mark system. Trade marks are periodically renewable, usually every ten years. 
For producers this could result in a considerable cost given that the trade mark 
would have to be renewed in every country where protection is sought. Under 
a sui generis system, provision can be made for a once off registration resulting 
in protection for as long as the conditions for protection are upheld. The fact 
that rights under the sui generis register will potentially be held in perpetuity, 
makes it very appropriate for the preservation of indigenous or traditional 
knowledge, such as a production technique. Also, as no individual or firm 
exercises exclusive monopoly control over the knowledge or information 
embedded in the protected indication, such knowledge remains in the public 
domain. This prevents the commodification of traditional knowledge as 
protection involves the codification of well established practices into rules that 
become part of public knowledge. 
 
The differences between geographical indications and trade marks allude to 
the fact that, despite arguments that it is analytically reasonable to consider 
geographical indications as a species of trade marks, a sui generis system which 
takes into account the unique characteristics of geographical indications may 
be more suited to allow for the successful valorisation of local products in 
South Africa. It is, therefore, envisaged that a sui generis system for the 
registration and protection of geographical indications would potentially 




In summary it is evident that the economic rationale for protecting 
geographical indications derives from the fact that place of origin may be used 
as a quality signal or alternatively the resources of the region may be captured 
in the origin labelled product as quality attributes. In the first instance the 
informative meaning of the geographical name is emphasized in order to 
reduce information asymmetries. Where place of origin is used as an attribute, 
resources of the region is used to increase the value of the product. The added 
value derived from these resources leads to a differentiation based on product 
“qualities” and consequently to the creation of niche markets. The collective 
monopolies which result from the institutionalisation process, provide 
producers within origin labelled niche markets the opportunity to protect and 
enhance the acquisitional potential of these markets and to transform the value 
added into an economic rent. Although this premium may be small, a 




restricting supply and creating barriers to entry, act as a powerful marketing 
tool by which to improve a product’s market access.   
 
The discussion above illustrates that providing protection for geographical 
indications is more than just linguistic monopolisation. The economic 
arguments presented in this paper provide a strong justification for the 
protection of geographical indications in the developing world, and South 
Africa in particular. In contrast to more commercialised products, indigenous 
p r o d u c t s  w i t h  s t r o n g  l i n k s  t o  i n d i g e n o u s  p e o p l e  h a v e  a n  a d v a n t a g e  i n  
establishing a geographical indication. The stronger the connection between 
the product and the region, as facilitated through its link with the indigenous 
people, the stronger the competitive advantage. This is in line with a study 
which found that geographical indications show the greatest potential to 
benefit local producers where traditional small scale production is still present, 
on the supply side, and where end-use products are marketed directly to 
consumers. In other words, they are less likely to be appropriate when the 
product is a commodity traded primarily in bulk (Downes and Laird, 1999).  
 
This confirms the potential of employing the economic benefits of 
geographical indications to enhance development for local communities 
throughout the developing world. While, in a South African context, products 
such as Rooibos have received much attention in the recent past, many other 
communities produce products derived from local resources and know-how. 
These products, such as Honeybush tea, Karoo Lamb and Amadumbe are all 
products that could potentially provide communities with an opportunity to 
valorise their resources, thereby accessing the economic benefits associated 
with geographical indications. Through the collective and inclusive nature of 
the system, a geographical indication provides a unique opportunity to engage 
local resources in regional development strategies. The challenge in South 
Africa would, however, be to ensure an inclusive and a representative 
industry organisation, which can facilitate geographical indication protection. 
Without this there exists a danger that the larger farmers and agribusiness 
firms could capture the economic benefits without any benefits (greater 
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Notes 
 
1.  “Know-how” 
2.  “Contradiction in terms” 
3.  “With” or “and” 
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